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 1 
Summary 
In this thesis I will look at how access to justice for NGOs has changed in 
the EU after the Union became a party to the Aarhus Convention. The 
Aarhus Convention gives individuals and environmental NGOs access to 
justice regarding access to environmental information, public participation 
in decision-making, but also in regard to private persons or public 
authorities in breach of national environmental law. EU has implemented 
the Convention through directives and regulations and the ECJ has played 
an important role as gap filler in recent case law. NGOs have in these cases 
been given wider access to justice in environmental matters at national level. 
But when it comes to access to justice at EU level, the legal situation has not 
changed much from before the Aarhus Convention. It is still practically 
impossible for an NGO to be directly and individually concerned in 
environmental matters. 
 
If the provisions on access to justice in the Aarhus Convention would be 
fully implemented at EU level and in its Member States, there would 
perhaps be a real possibility for the public to be involved in enforcing 
environmental law and protecting the environment. Then one could perhaps 
even say that the environment has been given a voice. 
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Sammanfattning 
I denna uppsats kommer jag att titta på hur miljöorganisationers talerätt har 
förändrats i EU efter det att EU ratificerade Århuskonventionen. 
Århuskonventionen ger individer och miljöorganisationer talerätt gällande 
tillgång till information, rätt att delta i beslutsprocesser, men också 
gentemot privatpersoner eller myndigheter som strider mot den nationella 
miljölagstiftningen. EU har införlivat konventionen genom direktiv och 
förordningar. Även EU-domstolen har spelat en viktig roll i att skapa ny 
rättspraxis där miljörättsorganisationer tillgång till rättslig prövning i 
miljöfrågor på nationell nivå har vidgats. När det gäller miljöorganisationers 
talerätt på EU-nivå, har situationen inte förändrats mycket sedan innan 
Århuskonventionen. Det är fortfarande praktiskt taget omöjligt för en 
miljöorganisation för att uppfylla kravet på individualisering i miljöfrågor. 
 
Om talerätten som Århuskonventionen ger miljöorganisationer införlivas 
fullt ut på EU-nivå och i medlemsstaterna, skulle det kanske finnas en reell 
möjlighet för allmänheten att se till så att miljölagstiftningen följs och på så 
sätt kunna skydda vår miljö. Då skulle man kanske till och med kunna säga 
att miljön har fått en röst. 
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Abbreviations 
ACCC  Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee 
CFI  Court of First Instance 
COM  European Commission 
EC  European Community 
ECJ  European Court of Justice 
EEB  European Environmental Bureau 
EIA  Environmental Impacts Assessment 
IPPC  integrated pollution prevention control 
NGO  non-governmental organization 
OJ  Official Journal of the European Union 
RAC  Regional Advisory Council 
SEA  strategic environmental assessment 
TEU  Treaty on European Union 
TFEU  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
UNECE United Nation Economic Commission for 
Europe 
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1 Introduction  
The environment cannot vote, go to court or speak for itself. Therefore it 
needs someone else to be its voice. Environmental NGOs have shown great 
dedication to protecting the environment for decades, and have recently 
been given access to justice through the Aarhus Convention in the European 
Union. In this thesis I will look at how access to justice has changed in the 
EU after the Union became a party to the Aarhus Convention. I will look at 
the possibility for both direct access at EU level and indirect access at 
national level to see if the Aarhus Convention has changed the possibility 
for NGOs to access court, so that they can be the voice the environment so 
desperately needs. 
 
1.1 Thesis, aim and delimitation 
The aim of this thesis is to answer the question if the environment has been 
given a voice through the Aarhus Convention and its implementation into 
EU law. In answering this question, I will examine the legal situation prior 
to the Aarhus Convention, and how the situation has changed after the 
Convention has been implemented. Do the legal instruments give NGOs 
right to access to justice that actually gives them the capacity to be the voice 
for the environment?  Have ECJ through its preliminary rulings given NGOs 
that capacity? I hope to answer these questions by looking at the legal 
framework that has been legislated after the EU signed the Aarhus 
Convention, and case law from the ECJ and the General Court. I will also 
look briefly at the situation in the Member States, the different approaches 
to standing and what access NGOs have to justice. Another question that I 
have looked at is if environmental NGOs can be the voice that the 
environment needs it to be.  
 
In this thesis, I have chosen to look only at standing for NGOs and not at 
standing for individuals. However, the rules on standing are much alike and 
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the case law concerning individual standing can therefore be relevant for my 
analysis. Another delimitation that I have made is that I will only look at the 
Aarhus Convention as the EU courts and national courts interpret it. I will 
therefore not look at case law from the ACCC and what effects the Aarhus 
Convention has had internationally.  
 
 I have chosen not to look at Art 9 (4) of the Aarhus Convention when 
looking at access to justice, concerning reasonable conditions of access (i.e. 
fair and effective procedures in terms of time and costs). Access to justice 
would not mean much if there were no possibility to actually use it. 
However, there is already a lot of material and case law concerning the rules 
on access to justice under 9 (1) – (3) and I have chosen to look at this in 
more detail to be able to make a more in depth analysis. This is also why I 
have chosen to do a brief overview of the situation on access to justice in 
Member States. It would be interesting to look at the different approaches to 
implement the Aarhus Convention in the Member States by examining two 
or three countries more in depth, and this was initially my goal. But 
throughout the process I have realized how big this subject is and I have 
chosen to limit the scope to the implementation and interpretation of the 
Aarhus Convention at EU level, and only briefly look at different 
approaches in Member States. 
 
There is a possibility for individuals and NGOs to challenge decisions taken 
by Member States contrary to environmental provisions put down in EU 
law, by rely on directives having direct effect. I have chosen not to look at 
this possibility, and instead focus on the rights of standing for NGOs 
through legislation on standing in treaties, directives and regulations, since 
the Aarhus Convention have not changed the direct effect doctrine.  
 
When looking at the legal position prior to the Aarhus Convention, I have 
chosen to focus on the Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty, and 
what changes that can be seen during this period (1993 – 1997). In 1998, the 
EU signed the Aarhus Convention, and therefore I have chosen to look at 
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the development in rules governing access to court in the EU just shortly 
before this.  After the EU signed the Aarhus Convention, new treaties have 
come into force, the Nice Treaty (2001) and the Lisbon Treaty (2009). The 
Nice Treaty did not change the legal situation on standing for NGOs, but the 
Lisbon Treaty has brought some changes that are discussed in the section 
‘standing for NGOs in the EU post the Aarhus Convention’.  
 
1.2 Material 
The starting point to this thesis has been the Aarhus Convention and Art 9 
concerning access to justice. To be able to explain in what areas NGOs have 
right to access to justice, I have also looked at the other provisions of the 
Convention. To study the implementation of the Aarhus Convention at EU 
level I have looked at legislation, directives, regulations and proposals for 
new directives both prior and post to the signing of the Aarhus Convention.  
 
I have also studied the scholarship on the Aarhus Convention and its 
implementation at EU level and at Member State level. I have looked at a 
number of studies carried out on access to justice in environmental matters 
after the EU became a party to the Aarhus Convention.  
 
In studying case law, I have looked at preliminary rulings from the ECJ as 
well as General Court rulings and appeals to the ECJ. I have focused on 
recent cases concerning the implementation of the Aarhus Convention, but 
also on earlier rulings to be able to see where the EU stood on access to 
justice prior to becoming a party to the Aarhus Convention. Recently there 
have been many important rulings on access to justice, concerning both 
individuals and NGOs. Since this thesis focuses on access to justice for 
NGOs, I have chosen not to look at the case law on individual standing 
except for key cases that also has changed the case law on standing for 
NGOs. I have not looked at any case law from national courts. Instead, I 
have relied on studies made on the implementation of the Aarhus 
Convention at national level.  
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My main focus has been on recent case law from the ECJ, since it has had 
the most impact on the development of access to justice for NGOs since the 
area has not been fully legislated.  In order to understand and analyse these 
cases better I have studied both scholarships and reports on access to justice.  
 
1.3 Method 
The method I have used in this thesis is the traditional legal theory, meaning 
that I have studied scholarships, case law and legislation in order to look at 
how the Aarhus Convention has been implemented in the EU. By studying 
the situation prior to the signing of the Convention and the situation after the 
EU became a party, I have been able to see how NGOs have been given 
stronger rights to standing, at least at Member State level. The ECJ has 
played an important role as gap filler, since the EU has n ot legislated fully 
in the area of access to justice. My focus has therefore been to study case 
law from the ECJ and the General Court, in order to analyse the way EU 
interprets the Aarhus Convention and the right of access to justice deriving 
from it, and how this has changed the possibilities for NGOs to access 
justice. 
 
I have looked at both primary sources, such as directives and regulations, as 
well as scholarships examining these sources. I have also looked at speeches 
and propositions for changing the legal framework. In doing this, I hoped to 
gather different aspects and viewpoints on the possibility for NGOs to 
access the court, but also which changes are needed. 
 9 
2 Giving the environment a 
voice? 
Already in the 1970s Christopher D. Stone published the article ‘Should 
Trees Have Standing’1  with the bold idea of giving the environment rights 
of its own. Even though there has been a shift in the way we see nature, we 
have not yet given it a right of its own. Christopher D. Stone advocates that 
the environmental rights should be protected by guardians. He proposes that 
environmental organizations could be those guardians, since they have the 
expertise in the field and have shown a tireless dedication to protect the 
environment.
2
 
 
Both at EU level and in the Member States the environmental protection has 
been placed in the hands of the administration. But the administration does 
not own the environment nor is best fit to defend it. The environment itself 
does not have a vice neither through voting nor through a strong group 
defending its interest. In times of economic need the administration is 
looking for solutions to its problems, even at the cost of the environment. 
According to Ludwig Krämer the economic interest therefore wins over the 
environmental interest in 999 out of 1 000 cases.
3
 But since the environment 
does not have a voice there is a tendency to say that things are slowly 
getting better. However, the statement from the European Environment 
Agency of 2001 shows a slow progress but a poor picture over all. This 
appears to be the case twelve years later. The structure in the EU to deal 
with global and regional environmental challenges could be improved. And 
a public involvement is indispensable, if we want to see a result.
4
 As the 
European Commissioner for Environment Janez Potočnik says in his speech 
                                                 
1
 Christopher D. Stone, ‘Should Trees Have Standing – Towards giving legal rights to 
natural objects’, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. (1972) pp. 450 – 501. 
2
 Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? – Law, Morality, and the 
Environment, 3
rd
 Edition, pp. xi, 8 – 9, 23. 
3 Ludwig Krämer, EU Environmental Law 7th Edition, pp. v-vii. 
4 Ludwig Krämer, EU Environmental Law 7th Edition, pp. v-vii, 444. See also Ludwig 
Krämer, ‘The environmental complaint in EU law’, 6(1) Journal for European 
Environmental & Planning Law (2009), pp. 13 – 35. 
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‘The fish cannot go to Court’, the environment cannot protect itself; it is a 
public good and needs to be protected by a public voice.
 5
  
 
The Aarhus Convention
6
 gives individuals and environmental NGOs access 
to justice regarding access to environmental information, public 
participation in decision-making but also in regard to private persons or 
public authorities in breach of national environmental law.
7
 If these 
provisions would be fully implemented at EU level and in its Member 
States, there would perhaps be a real possibility for the public to be involved 
in enforcing environmental law and protecting the environment. Then one 
could perhaps even say that the environment has been given a voice. 
  
                                                 
5
 SPEECH/12/856, Speech by Janez Potočnik, European Commissioner for Environment, 
“The fish cannot go to Court” – the environment is a public good that must be supported by 
a public voice, Brussels 2012. 
6
 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, (Aarhus Convention) 1998. 
7
 Aarhus Convention, Art 9 (1) – (3). 
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2.1 The Aarhus Convention 
The Aarhus Convention was launched in 1998 under the UNECE.  EU and 
its, at that time, 15 Member States signed the convention in April 1998 and 
ratified it in 2005 through Council Decision 2005/370
8
. The Convention 
entered into force in 2001 after the required 16 ratifications had been 
achieved.
9
 
 
It is the UNECE that administrates the Convention and the compliance by 
the parties is reviewed by ACCC. Since the EU and its member states both 
are party to the convention the ECJ constitutes as a review body for the 
compliance of the convention and the EU environmental law referring to it. 
The ACCC interprets the Convention to find if the party is in compliance 
with it or not. The ACCC cannot examine what national law should say, but 
what it cannot say, in order for the provisions of the Aarhus Convention not 
to be undermined. Under EU law on the other hand, Member States should 
report their implementation if EU legislation adopted to meet requirements 
from the Aarhus Convention and they can use the preliminary ruling system. 
If the member states have not fulfilled the implementation required the 
commission may bring the matter to the ECJ (Art 258 TFEU).
 10
 
 
A significant part of the Aarhus Convention is the fact that environmental 
groups are considered to be a part of the public or the public concerned as 
defined in Art 2(5) in the Aarhus Convention. NGOs are considered the 
public concerned if they promote an environmental protection and meet any 
requirements under national law.
11
 Industries have had a significant impact 
on regulations so far, and giving NGOs this status could constitute as 
leveling the playing field. A concern is that interest groups do not at all 
                                                 
8
 Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 February 2005 on the conclusion, on behalf of the 
European Community, of the Convention on access to information, public participation in 
decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters [2005] OJ L 124/I. 
9
 How far has the EU applied the Aarhus Convention?, European Environmental Bureau, 
2007. 
10
 Jerzy Jendroska, ‘Public Participation in Environmental Decision-Making’, in The 
Aarhus Convention at Ten – Interactions and Tensions between Conventional International 
Law and EU Environmental Law, pp. 147 – 152. 
11
 Aarhus Convention, Art 2(5). 
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times represent the public interest since there are many public interests in 
contrast to environmental interests. Another concern is that some 
environmental interests have different effect on different groups, and NGOs 
can therefore not represent them all.
12
 
 
The Aarhus Convention is divided up into three pillars; Right of access to 
environmental information, Public participation in environmental decision-
making and Access to environmental justice.
13
  
 
Access to information is one of the basic elements in a democracy. The state 
has an obligation to inform the public of its right to access information as 
well as to publish environmental information. In regard to environmental 
information it gives the public a possibility to control how the government 
regulates and how polluters behave. In return the public regulators and 
polluters know they are being watched. It also helps to increase the public 
awareness and helps to increase environmental oriented choices of 
individuals.
14
 EU Directive 90/313 on access to environmental information 
was an inspiration to the rule in the first pillar.
15
 Access to information is the 
most detailed pillar of the Convention. The definition of what constitutes as 
environmental information is broad and there is no need to state an interest 
to have a right to this information.
 16
 Though the right to information only 
relates to public authorities and there is no right to access information from 
private parties.
17
  
 
The second pillar refers to public participation in decision-making and there 
are three different stages that provide for public participation: ‘decisions on 
                                                 
12
 Maria Lee, EU Environmental Law: Challenges, Change and Decision-making, pp. 126 – 
139. 
13
 Aarhus Convention, Art 4 – 9. 
14
 Maria Lee, EU Environmental Law: Challenges, Change and Decision-making, pp. 127 – 
133, 152 – 158. 
15
 Ralph Hallo, ‘Access to Environmental Information. The Reciprocal Influences of EU 
Law and the Aarhus Convention’, in The Aarhus Convention at Ten – Interactions and 
Tensions between Conventional International Law and EU Environmental Law, p. 57. 
16
 Aarhus Convention, Art 4. 
17
 Aarhus Convention, Art 5 (6). 
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specific activities’18, ‘plans, programs and policies relation to the 
environment’19 and ‘the preparation of executive regulations and/or 
generally applicable legally binding normative instruments’20. Under the 
provision laid out in Art 6 of the Aarhus Convention, there should be 
reasonable time frames, as well as an effective and early public 
participation. Another requirement is to take due account to the outcome of 
this participation.  In regard to the provisions in Art 7 of the Aarhus 
Convention, the requirements are less strict and only involve the obligation 
to provide for opportunities to participate to the extent appropriate. Under 
Art 8 of the Aarhus Convention there is a requirement to strive for a public 
participation at an appropriate stage when there are still options available.
21
 
It is clear that the Aarhus Convention aims at increasing the participation of 
the public in areas which would otherwise be closed and to make this 
participation have a genuine influence on the outcome of those decisions.
22
 
 
The third pillar governs rules on standing, and who has the right to invoke a 
judicial process in regard to the rights set out in the Convention.
23
 
Regarding the right to access environmental information, the rules on 
standing in this respect are set out in Art 9 (1) of the Aarhus Convention. 
This access must be granted to any person that considers this right has been 
refused. There is no need to show an interest or an impairment of right, nor 
is there a need to live near the area or state a reason for wanting the 
information.
24
 Art 9 (2) of the Aarhus Convention sets out the rules on 
standing regarding public participation of decisions, acts and omissions by 
public authorities. The review procedure must only be provided to members 
of the public concerned who has either a “sufficient interest” or whose 
                                                 
18
 Aarhus Convention, Art 6. 
19
 Aarhus Convention, Art 7. 
20
 Aarhus Convention, Art 8. 
21
 Maria Lee, EU Environmental Law: Challenges, Change and Decision-making, pp. 133 – 
139. 
22
 Maria Lee, EU Environmental Law: Challenges, Change and Decision-making, pp. 158 – 
159.  
23
 DG ENV.A.2/ETU/2012/0009rl, Final Report, ‘Possible Initiatives to Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters and their socio-economic implications’, pp. 3 – 4. 
24
 Aarhus Convention, Art 9 (1). 
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“right has been impaired”.25 This distinction is due to the different legal 
systems in parties’ national legislation. In France for instance, standing is 
determined through showing an interest, whereas in Germany an 
impairment of right is a precondition to bringing an action. What constitutes 
as a sufficient interest or an impairment of a right should be decided 
according to national law and with the objectives to give the public 
concerned a wide access to justice in environmental matters. All NGOs that 
meet the requirements in Art 2(5) of the Aarhus Convention should be 
deemed to have standing.
26
 
 
In Art 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention it is set out that all other kinds of acts 
and omissions by private persons or by public authorities that go against 
national environmental law can give the right to standing.
27
 Since EU law 
forms a part of a Member States national legal system EU environmental 
law is applicable just as well as national environmental law. It is up to the 
parties to delimit the scope for standing as long as it is ‘transparent, clear 
and consistent’. However, it still has to be in line with the purpose of the 
Aarhus Convention.
 28
  
                                                 
25
 Aarhus Convention, Art 9 (2). 
26
 Bilun Müller, Access to the Courts of the Member States for NGOs in Environmental 
Matters under European Union Law. Journal of Environmental Law 23:3 (2011), pp. 505 – 
516 
27
 Aarhus Convention, Art 9 (3). 
28
 Jonas Ebbesson, ‘Access to Justice at the National Level. Impact of the Aarhus 
Convention and European Union’, in The Aarhus Convention at Ten – Interactions and 
Tensions between Conventional International Law and EU Environmental Law, pp. 262 – 
267. 
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2.2 The legal position in EU prior to the 
Aarhus Convention 
Only the ‘victim’ or an ‘aggravated party’ could seek remedy for an 
environmental wrong that he or she suffered from in most Member States 
prior to the Aarhus Convention. Without a direct link to the environmental 
damage, one could not access any judicial remedy.
29
  In this section, I will 
look at what legal framework existed in the area of access to justice in 
environmental matters, what possibilities there was to have access to courts 
in environmental matters, and what role the ECJ had on widening access to 
justice for NGOs.  
 
2.2.1 Access to justice 
The only legal provision on standing for individuals and NGOs provided in 
EC law prior to the Aarhus Convention is Art 173 of the Maastricht Treaty, 
which provides for access to ECJ or Court of First Instance concerning the 
legality of actions of EC institutions. Any natural or legal person may 
initiate proceedings, if a decision or regulation is directed to them or if they 
are individually and directly concerned.
30
 Both the ECJ and the Court of 
First Instance have been restrictive when interpreting what constitutes as a 
direct and individual concern.
31
 In the key case Plaumann
32
 from 1963, the 
restrictive approach on individual concern was launched. The so-called 
‘Plaumann-Test’ requires that ‘it affects them by reasons of certain 
attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which 
they are differentiated from all other persons by virtue of these factors 
distinguish them individually’33. This test is shaped according to traditional 
individual rights and personal interests, which is something that 
                                                 
29
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environmental cases do not fit into, since NGOs have a public interest to 
protect a public good. 
 
2.2.2 Propositions for greening the Treaty 
When the Union was established there was no public concern on protecting 
the environment, instead the idea of the Union was to defend individual 
interest of producers, traders and competitors and hence promote the general 
interest of the Union.
34
 However, the legal system in the Union has been 
changed drastically before, for example when the direct effect doctrine was 
introduced. In addition, the interests of the Union have changed. Art 130r of 
the EC Treaty states that the Union should improve the quality of the 
environment, and aim for a high level of protection of the environment. 
Ludwig Krämer means that introducing a right for individuals to access 
court concerning a public interest in environmental matters is no obstacle, 
neither in member states nor in challenging acts from EC institutions.
35
 
 
A proposal to amend the EC Treaty was made by a number of 
environmental organizations in the paper ‘Greening the Treaty II’36.  They 
proposed a new provision, Art 8d, saying: “Every citizen of the Union shall 
have the right to a clean and healthy environment, access to the decision-
making process, information, and justice as part of a general right to human 
development”37. 
 
The Commissioner seemed to approve this formulation when she in a 
speech to the European Environmental Bureau 1 December in 1995 stated 
that they should consider an inclusion in the Treaty of every citizen’s right 
                                                 
34
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35
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to information, access to decision-making and justices in relation to the 
environment in order to strengthen the democratic process in the Union.
 38
 
 
Greening the Treaty II also proposed that both organizations and individuals 
should have access to court under Art 169, 170, 173 and 175 of the EC 
Treaty. This is basically an actio popularis. The proposed changes of these 
articles constitute to give natural or legal persons a general right to 
challenge decisions under all sectors, policy, trade, competition, consumers 
etc.
 
The proposed change is that natural or legal persons that have an interest 
in the matter should have the opportunity to bring a matter to the ECJ if the 
commission fails to do so under Art 169 EC Treaty. Art 170 EC Treaty was 
proposed to be changed so that natural or legal persons would have the same 
opportunity as a member state to bring an action against a member state 
failing to imply an EC environmental legislation.
39
 
 
The Amsterdam Treaty was however not amended in regard to enhance the 
democratic dimension of the Treaty as proposed in Greening the Treaty II. 
There was not even a discussion on amending Art 169, 173 and 175 of the 
EC Treaty. This is not so surprising since most of the rules regarding 
standing for individuals and NGOs have been developed by the ECJ through 
preliminary rulings. Even though democratisation of the Union was one of 
the aims with the Amsterdam Treaty, there was no enhanced right to access 
to information in the legislating process either.
40
 However, the directive on 
environmental information 90/313 was an inspiration to the Aarhus 
Convention when setting down the rules on access to information.
 41
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2.2.3 Case law on access to justice 
A still important case on access to justice to EU institutions is Stichting 
Greenpeace
42
. This case has two parts: the first ruling from the Court of 
First Instance in 1995 and a ruling on the appealed to the ECJ was delivered 
in 1998. Spain was granted a large financial assistance form the Union to 
construct two power stations on the Canary Islands. Spain started the 
building process without the EIA fully carried out. Several proceedings 
were brought before the Spanish court against the authorisation of the two 
power stations. These applicants also brought an action of annulment to the 
Court of First Instance seeking an annulment of the decision to grant 
financial assistance. The Court of First Instance did not consider the 
appellants having standing and declared the action inadmissible.
43
 
 
The Court of First Instance held that the applicant must be able to show that 
he is affected in a way that differentiates him from all other persons to be 
considered individually and directly concerned. This is the case even though 
it is a question of environmental harm. The mere fact that the applicant will 
suffer harm is not considered enough, since this might be the case for a large 
number of persons who cannot be determined beforehand.
44
 The Court of 
First Instance did not find that the applicants have any attribute peculiar to 
them to differentiate them from all other persons that might be affected by 
environmental harm, thus they were not considered to have standing.
45
 As 
for the NGOs that also brought an action of annulment to the Court of First 
Instance, they were neither considered to have standing. The Court held that 
an association for the protection of a general interest could not be 
considered to have standing under Art 173 EC Treaty if its members do not 
have standing individually.
46
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An appeal to this ruling was brought to the ECJ who had a slightly different 
stand on the case. They emphasized that it was the building of the two 
power stations that the applicants wanted to evoke on the legal ground of the 
EIA Directive 85/337. Therefore, the contested decision on financial 
assistance by the Community can only affect the applicant indirectly and 
thus not give them standing. The applicants will still have an effective 
judicial remedy since their rights are fully protected by national law, and 
national courts have the possibility to refer a question to the Court under Art 
177 EC Treaty.
47
 
 
It is noteworthy that the ECJ takes a different stand than that of the Court of 
First Instance. They conclude that the appellants are only indirectly affected 
and therefore they have the same conclusion as the Court of First Instance; 
both the NGOs and the individuals lack standing.
48
 Ludwig Krämer means 
that this conclusion is wrong, since the community decision to give financial 
assistance was crucial for the actual building of the power stations. He 
continues that it is the lawfulness of the Community decision on financial 
assistance that is contested by the appellants, not the decision by the Spanish 
authorities to build the power stations.  Hence, the appellants are directly 
affected and should be considered to have standing.
49
   
 
Another key case is Danielsson and others
50
 regarding a decision 
concerning France nuclear testing in the French Polynesia where the 
Commission did not consider the testing being ‘a perceptible risk of 
significant exposure for workers or the general public’ and Art 34 of EAEC 
Treaty did not apply.
51
 This decision was contested, on the basis that 
Danielsson and others where individually affected by the harmful activities 
of the nuclear testing. However, the Court ruled that the fact that the persons 
might suffer personal damage linked to the nuclear test is not sufficient to 
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distinguish them individually. They have not been able to show any fact that 
the contested decision ‘affects them by reason of certain attributes peculiar 
to them’.52 Therefore they are not considered individually concerned, and do 
not have standing.
53
 
 
Danielsson and others confirmed the strict interpretation of direct and 
individual concern from the case Stichting Greenpeace. From these two 
cases, it is clear that it is practically impossible for NGOs to be granted 
standing before the ECJ. Even though Danielsson might suffer personal 
damage due to the nuclear testing, this was not considered to be enough to 
be individually concerned, since others living in the area would be affected 
in the same way. In Stichting Greenpeace, the Court of First Instance makes 
it clear that an NGO must show that its members are individually concerned 
to have standing. Even though many scholars have criticized these rulings, 
the case law has still not changed. Both cases are still relevant today, and as 
discussed later on in this thesis, these rulings still apply. 
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2.3 The legal position in EU post the 
Aarhus Convention 
Art 3 (1) of the Aarhus Convention provides for implementation of the 
Convention through legislation.
54
 When EU legislates in an area, they must 
follow fundamental principles of the Union. The principle of subsidiarity is 
one of them, which sets out the rule that the Union only have the 
competence to legislate in the areas where it has been given power to do so 
by the Member States.
55
 In this section I will look at the implementation of 
the Aarhus Convention that has been made through legislation. 
 
2.3.1 EU directives and regulations 
Directive 2003/04
56
 on access to environmental information replaced 
Directive 90/313
57
 to implement the first pillar in the Aarhus Convention.   
Directive 2003/35
58
 on Public participation implements the second pillar of 
the Aarhus Convention. It contains two parts, one part on a general public 
participation procedure, and one part amending the EIA and IPPC 
Directives
59
, improving public participation in those procedures. The 
obligation to allow for public participation only applies to natural and legal 
persons. The general provisions are basically the same as Art 6 in the 
Aarhus Convention. The public should be informed of the possibility to 
participate, have a possibility to affect the decision-making, and be informed 
of the final decision. The provisions in the EIA and IPPC process are quite 
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similar, but have a wider scope than the Convention since they also provide 
for cross border participation and contain provisions on access to justice.
60
 
The provisions on access to justice under the EIA and the IPPC Directive 
are identical and require Member States to grant access to justice for the 
public concerned if they have a sufficient interest or maintaining the 
impairment of a right. NGOs are considered the public concerned if they 
promote environmental protection and meet any requirements under national 
law. It is the Member State that determines what should be considered a 
sufficient interest or an impairment of a right, but in doing so, they must act 
under the objective to give the public ‘a wide access to justice’.61  
 
The public participation Directive 2003/35 concerns only existing 
legislation, but the Council have made it clear that it is the intention to 
include provisions on public participation in decision-making in future 
legislation on environmental plans and programs.
62
 As a consequence any 
impairment of the environment that falls outside the scope of the EIA and 
the IPPC Directives will not be covered by the rules on access to justice 
under the public participation Directive. This means for example that if 
there is a breach to the SEA Directive 2001/42
63
 or in the Habitat Directive 
92/43
64
 that is not caused by an EIA or an IPPC project, there is no right to 
access to justice.
65
 
 
Directive 2004/35
66
 on environmental liability contains provisions giving a 
possibility for citizens to submit requests to a public authority concerning 
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environmental damage caused. The administrative decision can then be 
contested.
67
 Also NGOs that meet requirements under national law should 
be able to challenge administrative actions and omission not only referring 
to environmental information and public participation in decision-making.
68
 
 
It took EU nine years to adopt a regulation, the so-called Aarhus 
Regulation
69
 , applying the provisions of the Aarhus Convention to its own 
institutions and bodies.
70
 The Aarhus Regulation contains provisions on 
every citizen’s right to access information held by the EU institutions, 
public participation and access to justice.
71
 The regulation applies to all 
bodies, except the ECJ. Before this regulation only the Commission, the 
Council and the Parliament had to give out environmental information.
72
  
The Member States have more responsibilities for giving NGOs an adequate 
participation in decision-making than the European institutions and bodies. 
There are obligations for Member States to both inform and to consult 
NGOs for those responsibilities to be considered met, but no such 
obligations exists in the Aarhus Regulation. It only requires the European 
institutions and bodies to inform the public and give an opportunity for the 
public to participate. There is no obligation to consult the public. This goes 
against the Sixth Environmental Action Programme, stating that “a real 
effort is to be made to ensure that the full range of interested groups is given 
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the opportunity to influence decision-making”73. In addition, it also 
contravenes Art 7 of the Aarhus Convention, setting out an obligation to 
undertake all measures necessary to involve members of the public in the 
decision-making.
74
 The provisions on access to justice for NGOs laid down 
in the Aarhus Regulation will be examined more in detail in the next section 
on access to justice for NGOs at EU level.  
 
2.3.2 Proposal for a directive on access to justice 
The third pillar of the Aarhus Convention has not yet been fully 
implemented in EU law. A proposal on access to justice was made in 2004, 
COM (2003) 624 Final
75
. The proposal suggested that NGOs would be 
given standing in cases where national environmental law was breached, 
also implementing Art 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention. Even though the 
proposal suggested that there would only be limited costs to put this 
proposal into practice and that a lot of benefits (both better compliance to 
environmental legislation and less pollution) the Member States was hard to 
convince.
76
 Some of the Member States contested this proposal, saying that 
the proposal was against the subsidiarity principle, and the proposal did not 
pass. Since then not much have been made to implement Art 9 (3) of the 
Aarhus Convention into EU law.
77
 However, Janez Potočnik expresses in 
his speech ‘The fish cannot go to Court’ that it is time to renew the proposal 
on a directive on access to justice in environmental matters. In his view the 
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need for a directive is indispensable.
 78
 There have also recently been signs 
from the Commission, the Council and the Parliament that they want to 
provide for a full access to justice in environmental matters. Once again a 
directive on access to justice is on the political agenda in EU, this time due 
to the progressive rulings from ECJ on access to justice.
79
 
 
2.3.3 Direct effect of the Aarhus Convention 
The question of the direct effect of the Aarhus Conventions has recently 
been tested by the ECJ in the case C-240/09 Slovak Brown Bear
80
. This case 
will be further discussed in the chapter on ECJs stand on indirect effect of 
EU law, and I will only look at the aspects of direct effect in this section. 
The ECJ stated that since Decision 2005/370 ratified the Aarhus Convention 
the provisions in the Convention form an integral part of the legal order of 
the Union. Therefore the ECJ has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on 
the interpretation of the meaning of the Aarhus Convention.
81
 From the 
case, it is clear that the Aarhus Convention is capable of having direct effect 
if its provisions meet the general criteria of direct effect, and the criteria for 
direct effect on international agreements, but Art 9 (3) of the Convention is 
not considered to meet the criterion and does not have direct effect.
82
 
 
When looking at direct effect of the Aarhus Convention in Member States 
the issue is much more complicated and the area not to well researched. In 
some of the Member States, precise opinion on direct effect of certain 
provisions has been made, and in others, the courts have been hesitant to 
accept the Aarhus Convention having direct effect at all. Most Member 
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States seems to have a rather restrictive approach towards giving the Aarhus 
Convention direct effect. Instead, they interpret the obligations streaming 
from secondary Community legislation. This also seems to be the case when 
Member States legislate to implement the Aarhus Convention.
83
 This in turn 
enforced by the ECJ that only examine the compliance of Member States to 
the directives implementing the Convention and not to the Convention itself. 
Meaning that if a directive is not correctly implementing a provision from 
the Convention a Member State is likely to do the same mistake.
84
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2.4 Access to justice for NGOs at EU level 
post the Aarhus Convention 
The EU is the only party of its kind, as it is the only party that is not a 
nation. The fact that the Member States already were a party to the Aarhus 
Convention was not enough for the Union, that wanted to be a party in its 
own right as well. Meaning that, the Aarhus Convention would not only 
affect the EU through its Member States, but that the Convention would 
apply to the institutions and bodies of the Union as well. When the EU 
became a party to the Convention, it had already adopted legislation 
implementing areas of the Aarhus Convention with binding effect to its 
Member States. However, the Union wanted to subscribe the values and 
principles embodied in the Convention to its own institutions and bodies.
85
 
If this has actually been done will be examined next. 
 
2.4.1 The Aarhus Regulation 
As explained earlier the Aarhus Regulation, adopted in 2006, implements 
the Aarhus Convention at EU level. It contains provision on access to 
environmental information, public participation in decision-making and 
access to justice. In this section, I will look at the actual level of access to 
justice that is given to NGOs at EU level. In order to implement Art 9 of the 
Aarhus Convention on access to justice a two-step approach is provided for 
in the Aarhus Regulation.  This is done through an internal review of 
administrative acts adopted by EU institutions and through allowing 
environmental organizations to initiate proceeding before the ECJ in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty.
86
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2.4.1.1 Internal review 
Art 10 of the Aarhus Regulation set out the criteria for NGOs to be able to 
request an internal review of an institution or body that adopted an 
‘administrative act’ or should have adopted an ‘administrative act’. For an 
NGO to be considered a qualified entity it shall be non-profit, an 
independent legal person, its primary stated objective should be to promote 
the protection of the environment in the context of environmental law, have 
existed for more than two years, and last the subject matter to be reviewed 
should be covered by the NGOs objective and prior activities.
87
 The 
Commission looks at if these criteria are met on a case-by-case basis. 
However, the fact that NGOs are not considered to be a qualified entity is 
not the main obstacle, it is the term ‘administrative act’. Art 2(1) (g) of the 
Aarhus Regulation defines what is considered an ‘administrative act’ as any 
measure of individual scope under environmental law, taken by a 
Community institution or body, and having an external legally binding 
effect. This means that legally binding acts with no external effect and 
normative acts of a general scope are not to be susceptible to the internal 
review process. Meaning that, a review process on internal instructions and 
guidelines, as well as regulations and directives will be considered 
inadmissible.
88
 Another exemption to what is considered an ‘administrative 
act’ is in Art 2(2) of the Aarhus Regulation, stating that administrative acts 
or omissions should not include measures taken by a Community institution 
or body in its capacity as an administrative body. That excludes acts under 
competition rules, and infringement proceedings against Member States.
89
 
There is no legal base for this latter exemption in the Aarhus Convention.  
 
The Commission tends to favor a restrictive interpretation of what 
constitutes as an ‘administrative act’ as defined in the Aarhus Regulation. 
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Thus far, the Commission has considered seven out of eight applications for 
internal review inadmissible because they are not considered ‘administrative 
acts’. The eighth application was declared unfounded. The Commission 
seems willing to stretch the notion of measures of general application as far 
as possible in order not to recognize an act as individual in scope.
90
  
 
The fact that the threshold of admissibility in internal review procedures 
constitute as a serious obstacle can be due to the two-stage procedure used 
by the Commission. First, the decision on admissibility is delegated to the 
Director-General or the head of the department responsible for the 
challenged act. It is only if the request is found admissible at this first step 
the Collage of Commissioners will take a decision on the merits, which 
rarely happens. The actual impact of the provisions of access to justice as 
laid down in the Aarhus Regulation will therefore largely be determined by 
the possibility of judicial review at the end of the process.
91
 
 
2.4.1.2 Judicial Review  
Art 12 of the Aarhus Regulation sets out the possibility for a judicial review 
by the ECJ. The formulation of the provision was a result of a political 
discussion and a compromise between the Council bodies. It was watered 
down, and whether the provision will result in a wider access to justice or 
just confirm the status quo is still unsure since no judgment have been made 
by the ECJ or by the General Court.
92
 Art 12 of the Aarhus Regulation 
provides for NGOs that have made a request for an internal review to 
institute proceedings before the ECJ in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Treaty. These provisions are Art 263 TFEU (action of 
annulment) and Art 265 TFEU (action for failure to act). Even though these 
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provisions are not identical, the case law has evolved in parallel and tends to 
apply the same criteria for standing.
93
 This regulation could provide for an 
administrative review, but since the criterion for standing under Art 263 (4) 
TFEU have not changed there seem to be little chance of an actual judicial 
review.
94
 In order to assess whether NGOs have a possibility get a judicial 
review, I will look at access to justice under Art 263 TFEU. 
 
2.4.2 Access to justice under Art 263 (4) TFEU 
The action of annulment was initially created in order for Member States to 
challenge acts adopted by the supranational institutions of the Union and 
where these institutions could challenge each other’s acts. Member States 
and Institutions are ‘privileged applicants’ since their standing cannot be 
questioned. However, natural and legal persons were also giving standing as 
‘non-privileged applicants’. Their standing is never presumed and has to be 
established in every individual case. Any claimant that establishes standing 
can seek full judicial review of the substantive and procedural legality.
 95
 
The Union was in the beginning aimed at market integration and the 
standing rules where intended to protect an importer, exporter or other 
market participants that was affected in his or her particular private interests. 
Therefore it is still the case today that there are often no problems for 
market participant to show an individual and direct concern. This is different 
when it concerns matters of a more general and normative character 
(decisions on environmental plans or compulsory emission trading) that is 
contested by a market participant. When it comes to the possibility for 
NGOs to object to an act on environmental grounds, they cannot, almost by 
definition, fulfill a distinguishing function. Hence, the more serious the 
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environmental harm is, the wider the group likely to be affected, and the 
harder it is to meet the criterion for direct effect.
96
 
 
The early criteria for standing for ‘non-privileged applicants’ were to be 
addressed directly by a decision or a decision or regulation directed to 
another person that are of direct and individual concern to the former.
97
 The 
well-known case Plaumann
98
 from 1963 sets the restrictive interpretation of 
standing for natural and legal persons. This test is shaped according to 
traditional individual rights and personal interests, which is something 
environmental cases do not fit into. Environmental matters are by its very 
nature the opposite of this, a public interest protecting the common good.
99
  
 
This rigid doctrine was challenged in the cases Jégo-Quéré
100
 and 
UPA
101
.
102
 Advocate General Jacobs argued in UPA that the meaning of 
‘individual concern’ should be altered so that a person challenging a general 
measure should be able to have an ‘individual concern’ if the measure by 
peculiar circumstances to him have, or is liable to have, a substantial 
adverse effect on his interests.
103
 The Court of First Instance in the case 
Jégo-Quéré referred to the Advocate General Opinion in UPA, since the 
case was still pending.
104
 CFI held that it was it necessary to derive form the 
set case law in order to ensure effective judicial protection for individuals. 
The court ruled that “a natural or legal person is to be regarded as 
individually concerned by a Community measure of general application that 
concerns him directly if the measure in question affects his legal position, in 
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a manner which is both definite and immediate, by restricting his rights or 
by imposing obligations on him”105. 
 
However, the established doctrine was strongly reaffirmed by the EJC in the 
appeal.
106
 In UPA the ECJ ruled against the Advocate General Opinion, and 
stated that such an interpretation of Art 230 (4) EC Treaty goes beyond the 
jurisdiction of the Community Courts. If necessary, such an interpretation 
could only be introduced by an amendment of the Treaty made by the 
Member States.
107
 A similar explicit ruling was made in the case Jégo-
Quéré.
108
 
 
Even though these two cases concern individual standing and not standing 
for NGOs, they are important cases on the interpretation on ‘individual and 
direct concern’, which applies the same to individuals as it does to NGOs. 
 
With the Lisbon Treaty a change was made to the forth section of Art 263 
TFEU, so that ‘non-privileged applicants’ do not have to show an individual 
concern against a regulatory act that does not entail implementing 
measures.
109
 The term regulatory act is not defined or used anywhere else in 
the Treaty, but it is often assumed that it refers to a normative act of general 
application. But according to Poncelet it must be interpreted to mean the 
opposite of the construction of a ‘legislative act’. It is uncertain how this is 
actually interpreted by the Court, and needs clarification.
110
  In the so-called 
Inuit case
111
 the General Court ruled on the interpretation of ‘regulatory act’ 
under Art 263 (4) TFEU. Looking at the wording and the intention of the 
                                                 
105
 Case T-177/01 Jégo-Quéré v Commission, para. 51. 
106
 Report on Compliance of EU to Aarhus, 2009, p. 31. 
107
 Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677, paras. 
37, 44. 
108
 Case C-263/02 P Commission v Jégo-Quéré [2004] ECR I-3425. 
109
 Art 263 (4) TFEU, and P Craig and G de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 5
th
 
Edition, pp. 491 – 493. 
110
 Charles Poncelet, ‘Access to Justice in Environmental Matters – Does the European 
Union Comply with its Obligations?’, Journal of Environmental Law 24:2, 2012, pp. 287 – 
309. 
111
 Case T-18/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others v the European Parliament, the 
Council of the European Union and the European Commission, General Court. 
 
 33 
Treaty, the General Court ruled that a regulatory act cannot be a legislative 
act. The regulation on a ban of seal products that was contested in this case 
was considered to be a legislative act and the 4
th
 indent is therefore not 
applicable. Instead the ‘direct and individual concern’ criterion is at hand. 
This narrow interpretation of ‘regulatory act’ was recently confirmed in the 
Opinion of Advocate General Kokott
112
. She means that the intention of 
adding a 4
th
 indent to Art 263 TFEU was to widen the access for individuals. 
However, there was also a change to Art 19 (1) TEU giving wider access for 
individuals in national courts. This means that the legal remedies available 
to individuals do not necessarily have to be met through a direct remedy 
before European Union Courts.
 113
 It seems that the General Court so far has 
subscribed to a narrow interpretation to ‘regulatory act’. Regarding the 
question of further implementation measures, this narrows down the 
application of the provision even more since most EU environmental rules 
need further implementation.
114
 One can come to the conclusion that the 
changes to direct effect by the Lisbon Treaty will not be significant, and will 
not change much of the existing case law. 
 
2.4.3 Case law on direct access for NGOs 
 
2.4.3.1 Case law on internal review 
Two recent cases, T-338/08 Stichting Natuur v Commission
115
 and T-396/09 
Vereniging Milieudefensie
116
 from the General Court, question the strict 
interpretation of ‘administrative act’ in the internal review procedure under 
the Aarhus Regulation. In both cases the General Court comes to the 
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conclusion that the interpretation of ‘administrative act’ under Aarhus 
Regulation is contrary to Art 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention.
117
 Since Art 9 
(3) of the Aarhus Convention was implemented through Art 10 (1) together 
with Art 2(1) (g) of the Aarhus Regulation, the General Court found itself to 
have jurisdiction to review the validity of those provisions.
118
 The 
Commission held in Stichting Natuur v Commission that Art 9 (3) of the 
Aarhus Convention did not apply since it acted in a legislative capacity. The 
General Court replied that it is true that Art 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention 
does not apply to institution bodies acting in its legislative capacity. 
However, in the present case, the Commission acted with its implementing 
powers and Art 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention is applicable.
119
  
 
The General Court examines the meaning of ‘act’ in Art 9 (3) of the Aarhus 
Convention. Since ‘act’ is not defined in the Aarhus Convention, the 
General Court looks at the objectives of the Convention to determine the 
meaning of ‘act’, and comes to the conclusion that: 
“It must be held that an internal review procedure which covered only 
measures of individual scope would be very limited, since acts adopted in 
the field of the environment are mostly acts of general application. In the 
light of the objectives and purpose of the Aarhus Convention, such 
limitation is not justified.”120 
 
There is no possibility to limit the scope of ‘acts’ in the light of the 
conditions set out in Art 263 (4) TFEU. The possibility for judicial remedy 
under the Aarhus Regulation is separate from the possibility to internal 
review and the conditions set out in Art 263 (4) TFEU and must still be met 
in order to access the Court under judicial review.
121
  
 
In a press release from EEB and ClientEarth Today, they condemn the 
decision of the Commission to appeal against these two rulings, saying that 
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the taxpayers’ money goes to limit the democratic right of the people. They 
also mean that the Commission fails in its role as guardian of the Treaty, as 
the Commission first fails to implement the international agreement 
correctly and then appeals the Court ruling without any sound legal 
arguments.
122
 
 
The conclusion one can draw from these two cases are that the General 
Court finally makes a clear statement towards relaxing the strict 
interpretation of an ‘administrative act’ as defined in the Aarhus Regulation. 
This means that NGOs should have a wider access to the internal review 
process. The cases do however not seem to relax the interpretation of Art 
263 (4) TFEU, but rather keep the rigid interpretation in existing case-law. 
This matter is however rather political as one can see from the press release 
commented on above, and the fact that the Commission appeals both the 
decisions. To see what impact this ruling will actually have on access to 
internal review one simply will have to wait for the judgment of the ECJ. 
The cases Júego Quéré and UPA where the CFI previously have tried to 
relax the rules on standing, the existing case law have been strongly 
reaffirmed by the ECJ.
123
 
 
2.4.3.2 Case law on judicial review 
As for the case law on access to justice under 263 (4) TFEU three important 
cases are Stichting Natuur
124
, Região autónoma dos Açores
125
 and WWF-
UK
126
. 
 
Stichting Natuur concerns the chemicals atrazine and simazine not being 
included in Annex I in Council Directive 91/414/EEC.
127
 EEB and Stichting 
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Natuur en Milieu, which are bringing the action are not considered to be 
individually concerned, and the rigid interpretation of Art 263 (4) TFEU 
from Plaumann and Stichting Greenpeace is once again confirmed. The fact 
that the provisions ‘affect the applicants in their objective capacity as 
entities protecting the environment, in the same manner as any other person 
in the same situation’ is not considered enough for an individual concern.128 
The case also confirmed the case law concerning effective judicial 
protection set down in UPA.
129
 A question of the interpretation of the 
Aarhus Regulation is raised by EEB and Stichting Natuur en Milieu. Since 
they fulfill all the requirements laid down in the Aarhus Regulation for an 
NGO, they mean that they should be considered to have standing under Art 
263 (4) TFEU. The Court does not share this interpretation and refers to the 
norm hierarchy, and that secondary legislation cannot override a primary 
legislation source like Art 263 (4) TFEU.
130
 
 
In the case Região autónoma dos Açores the settled case law on the 
interpretation of ‘individual concern’ in Plaumann and the question of 
effective remedies in UPA are confirmed.
131
 In Região autónoma dos 
Açores the CFI looks at the compatibility of Art 263 (4) TFEU with Art 9 
(3) Aarhus Convention, concluding that the Aarhus Regulation was 
legislated to implement this provision and grants some NGOs right to 
access. However, the NGOs in the present case do not fulfill the 
requirements laid down in the Aarhus Regulation.
132
 The CFI does not 
answer the question of what would have happened if the NGO fulfilled 
these requirements. This question was however answered in Stichting 
Natuur, where the EJC made it clear that such an interpretation of the 
Aarhus Regulation goes against the norm hierarchy. 
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The case WWF-UK concerns the WWF’s right as a party of a fishery 
regulation NO 41/2007, setting up the total allowable catches of cod. WWF-
UK is a member of the RAC (Regional Advisory Council) which according 
to the contested regulation has a right to be heard before an adoption of a 
measure. It is not certain if the WWF-UK has the same right as the entity 
(RAC). However, the court came to the conclusion that there is no right for 
the entity or its members to challenge the validity of this regulation in terms 
of its substantial content.
133
  
 
It is clear from these cases on access to justice under Art 263 (4) TFEU that 
rigid interpretation of ‘individual concern’ from early case law still applies. 
The implementation of the Aarhus Convention in the Aarhus Regulation has 
not changed the settled case law under Art 263 (4) TFEU. This means that it 
is still virtually impossible for NGOs to be considered to have standing. It 
could therefore be questioned if the EU complies with the Aarhus 
Convention. The EU itself seems to think that it is enough to grant wide 
access to justice in the Member States since there is a possibility for a 
preliminary ruling in the ECJ. The ECJ has been much more willing to relax 
the rules on standing in preliminary rulings concerning access to justice in 
Member States, which the next section will tackle.  
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2.5 Access to justice for NGOs at Member 
State level post the Aarhus Covention 
According to Art 19 (1) TEU, Member States must provide for remedies 
sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by the 
Union. How this is done is up to the legal order of each Member State to 
designate, the so-called ‘national procedural autonomy’. The ECJ has 
introduced two important requirements that must be satisfied, the principle 
of equivalence (that a Union dispute may not be less favored than a 
domestic action), and the principle of effectiveness (national rules may not 
render impossible, or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by 
the Union legal order).
134
 Individuals and NGOs are dependent on the 
national legal procedural law to have access to court, which varies in the 
Member States.
135
 
 
From the EU institutions there is a clear interest to improve access to justice 
on a national level.
136
 This has been done not only though directives but also 
by the ECJ through preliminary rulings. I will start to look at some of the 
recent case law from the ECJ to see the view that the EU has on giving 
access to NGOs in the Member States. I will thereafter look at the different 
approaches on access to justice, and rules governing standing for NGOs in 
Member States. 
 
2.5.1 Case-law on indirect access for NGOs 
In recent years a number of important cases have clarified rules on access to 
justice in Member States. The cases Djurgaarden
137
 and Trianel
138
 concern 
under what circumstances NGOs should be considered to have access to 
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court in regard to public participation in decision-making. Boxus and 
others
139
 and Solvay and others
140
 clarify the conditions for a legislation 
giving permit to construction, and what rights individuals have to review 
this legislation. Hence they also concern public participation in decision-
making. The case Slovak Brown Bear
141
 concerns enforcement of 
environmental law, other than access to information and public 
participation. 
 
2.5.1.1 Djurgaarden 
Djurgaarden is the first important case on the application of the Aarhus 
Convention at Member State level. The Municipality of Stockholm wanted 
to construct a tunnel for electronic cables. An EIA was carried out and the 
construction was allowed by Miljödomstolen. Miljöskyddsföreningen 
however appealed the decision, but the appeal was considered inadmissible 
since they did not fulfill the condition of having at least 2000 members to be 
considered having standing.
142
 The main questions before the ECJ concern 
whether members of the public should have access to challenge a decision 
even though they had the opportunity to participate in the court hearing, and 
whether the requirements on NGOs set by the Swedish legislation was too 
restrictive.
143
  
 
The answer to the first question is that the party should have the right to 
access a review process regardless of the role they might have played in the 
previous process, because the two different processes serve different 
purposes.
144
 Regarding the second question it is up to the national legislators 
to set the requirements for non-governmental organizations, but the 
legislation should ensure “wide access to justice” and render the rules under 
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Directive 85/337 effective.
145
 This means that the ‘useful effect doctrine’ is 
applied to the case, a great example of when the ECJ applies general 
principles of EU law to enhance environmental protection.
146
 A minimal 
number of members might be effective to know if an organization exists and 
is active, but a number cannot be fixed so that it goes against the objectives 
of the Directive. In the present case only two NGOs have over 2000 
members in Sweden, and local associations were deprived of any judicial 
remedy. The number was therefore set too high.
147
 
 
Advocate General Sharpston shares the view of the ECJ, but clarifies the 
two questions some. Regarding the first question, Sweden gives wide access 
during the administrative process, and therefore has stricter rules when 
implementing 10a of Directive 85/337.
148
 This is however not considered to 
be reason enough to allow higher requirements for an appealing NGO. 
 
2.5.1.2 Trianel 
In the case Trianel the German coal-fired power station Trianel received a 
preliminary permit to construct and operate a coal-fired power station in 
Lünen, close to a special area for conservation within the meaning of the 
Habitats Directive. Friends of the Earth initiated proceedings of an 
annulment of this decision.
 149
 In German law there has to be an impaired 
right to be able to evoke standing. In this case the special areas for 
conservation are considered a general public interest and individuals are 
therefore not considered to be able to have an impaired right. This means 
that NGOs cannot either, since they have to rely on an individual’s impaired 
right.
150
 Friends of the Earth was not considered to have standing according 
to German law, but the court thought this might go against Directive 85/337 
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(as amended by 2003/35/EC), and a preliminary reference was sent to the 
ECJ.
151
 
 
There are two ways for Member States to implement access to justice under 
Directive 85/337, either through a “sufficient interest in bringing the action” 
or through “the impairment of a right”. What this means is to be determined 
by the Member State, but has to be in line with “giving a wide access to 
justice”. This means that NGOs should have either a sufficient interest or an 
impaired right, depending on which alternative is implemented.
152
 The 
concept of “impaired rights” cannot depend on conditions that only physical 
or legal persons can fulfill, such as being a close neighbor or suffering in 
another way. These rights must further be interpreted to include national law 
implementing EU environmental law, and the rules of EU environmental 
law having direct effect. Consequently the national law flowing from the 
Habitat Directive must be capable to be relied on by an NGO.
153
 The last 
question concerns if Art 6 in the Habitat Directive can be relied upon 
directly by an NGO in a national court.  Art 10a Directive 85/337 is 
considered to be clear and unconditional, and therefore has direct effect. An 
NGO is therefore able to rely on Art 6 in the Habitat Directive, under the 
judicial proceeding pursuant to Art 10a Directive 85/337, even where 
national law prohibits this.
154
 
 
The impact of this case will be big in Germany, even if it will only apply to 
areas within the scope of EU environmental law. From now on, 
environmental NGOs will be able to rely on a general public interest before 
an administrative court, and do not have to show an impairment of an 
individual right.
155
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2.5.1.3 Boxus and others and Solvay and others 
In the two linked cases Boxus and others and Solvay and others, six actions 
have been brought against the Walloon state regarding airports and railway 
lines. But during this process, new legislation (a Decree) has been passed 
allowing the constructions. The applicants mean that this Decree was not 
compatible with either Aarhus Convention or the EIA directive. In Boxus 
and others Conseil d’Etat has stopped the proceedings and asked for a 
preliminary ruling both before the Constitutional Court and the ECJ. In 
Solvay and others, the Constitutional court has in their turn asked for a 
preliminary ruling regarding the same case.
156
 
 
The ECJ essentially comes to the conclusion that the Decree needs to fulfill 
two conditions for Directive 85/337 not to be applicable. The project must 
have been allowed through a specific legislative act, and the objectives of 
Directive 85/337 have been achieved by the legislative process. It is up to 
the national court to determine whether these conditions should be 
considered met.
157
 The second question refers to whether there has to be a 
possibility for the public to review the Decree. If the previous conditions are 
met, the rules in the Aarhus Convention and Directive 85/337 do not apply. 
But if those conditions are not considered met, there Member States must 
provide for a review procedure. There must, therefore be a possibility to 
review whether a legislator act fulfills these conditions or not. If the national 
court in the present case finds that the legislation does not fulfill the 
conditions and that there is no court of law that can review the substantial or 
procedural validity of that legislation it must be disapplied.
158
 This means 
essentially that a national legislation cannot be passed without fulfilling the 
requirements of the EIA Directive, or it can be appealed by an NGO. The 
ECJ gives NGOs wide access since there must be a possibility to review if 
the conditions are met. 
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2.5.1.4 Slovak Brown Bear 
The case Slovak Brown Bear concerns an NGO wanting to become a party 
to a dispute about the habitat of the brown bear, covered by the Habitat 
Directive. The main question referred to the ECJ is whether an NGO can 
rely directly on Art 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention, as a part of EU 
environmental law.
159
 Since the Aarhus Convention was approved by the 
community in Directive 2005/307, it now forms an integral part of the 
Union, and ECJ therefore has jurisdiction to interpret such an agreement. 
For the Aarhus Convention to be able to have direct effect under EU law, 
the EU must have exercised its powers and legislated in the field, otherwise 
it is up to the national court to determine if the Convention has direct effect 
according to national law.
160
 In the present case, the brown bear is subject to 
a system of strict protection under the Habitat Directive, and specific 
derogation rules apply. Therefore the ECJ considered the dispute to fall 
within the scope of EU law.
161
 
 
For an agreement between the EU and a non-member country to have direct 
effect, the provision must contain a clear and precise obligation, which is 
not subject to further implementation.
162
 Art 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention 
cannot be considered to have direct effect, since it does ‘not contain any 
clear and precise obligation capable of directly regulating the legal position 
of individuals’.163 However, Art 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention has the 
intention to ensure effective environmental protection, and it is up to the 
national courts to interpret national law in line with the objectives of this 
article, ‘to the fullest extent possible’. That means to enable NGOs to 
challenge an administrative decision contrary to EU environmental law.
164
 
Even if Art 9 (3) is not considered clear and precise enough to have direct 
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effect, it is still clear enough to enable an NGO to challenge the Slovak 
ministry’s decisions.165 
 
This means that even though Art 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention is not 
considered to have direct effect, national court must interpret domestic 
procedural rules in a way that NGOs are able to challenge administrative 
decisions. This is significant since it applies to all areas of EU 
environmental law, not only to access to information and public 
participation in decision-making. Art 9 (3) of the Aarhus Convention was 
previously considered only to create obligations on EU Member States as 
international law, and not from EU law. 
166
  
 
2.5.1.5 Conclusions 
The ECJ have through these rulings given NGOs a wider access to justice in 
environmental matters in Member States. Member States must grant wide 
access to justice when determining the limitations on NGOs regarded to 
have right to standing. If the national legislation does not meet the 
requirements for access to justice it must be set aside, and EU 
environmental provisions with direct effect can instead be relied upon by 
individuals or NGOs. Even outside the scope of access to environmental 
information and public participation in decision-making, NGOs should have 
access to justice under the scope of EU law. However, it is still up to the 
national courts to determine when EU environmental law is at hand and if 
the national legislation should be set aside. Outside the scope of EU 
environmental law, the national provisions still stand. Not only does this 
reaffirm the need to protect the environment, but it also strengthens the role 
for NGOs to enforce environmental protection. This has mainly been done 
by preliminary rulings from the ECJ, but also by the national courts 
referring the questions. The European Union might not have the capacity to 
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legislate on wider access to national courts. Instead the ECJ goes through 
the back door and interprets existing legislation to grant wide access to 
justice. Giving wide access to justice in Member States is not only a way for 
the EU to enhance environmental protection but also a way to grant legal 
remedies for individuals and NGOs without changing the rigid doctrine on 
direct access to EU Courts.  
 
Even though these rulings have strengthened the legal protection system in 
Member states, there is still a pressing need for a more comprehensive 
regime. To do this is not up to the Courts, but to the legislators. The lack of 
a harmonized framework has led to a variation of the accessibility to courts 
in Member States in environmental matters. And many barriers still stand in 
the way for an effective judicial remedy for NGOs in environmental 
matters.
167
 
 
2.5.2 Access to justice in Member States 
It is theoretically possible in most Member States for NGOs to access 
administrative courts to review an administrative act concerning the 
environment. There are three main approaches on standing for NGOs in 
administrative courts, an extensive approach, a restrictive approach and an 
intermediate approach.  
 
The extensive approach is in the form of an actio popularis, which gives a 
broad right of standing and have been met by a strong resistance in most 
Member States. There is a worry that unrestricted access to court would 
result in the judicial system crashing. Portugal and Latvia gives this broad 
access to NGOs. The Netherlands have had a form of an actio popularis 
before, but have recently changed this to a more restrictive approach. In the 
UK, case law has recently given wider access to justice for NGOs and does 
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give broad standing even though one cannot call it an actio popularis since 
it is within a common law system.
 168
 
 
The restrictive approach focuses on individual rights, and standing is only 
granted if there has been a violation of a right that is intended to protect the 
plaintiff and not a general interest. For an NGO to be granted standing it 
must demonstrate a breach of its own rights (a direct injury to its financial 
assets or its property). In addition the scope of the review is narrow, and 
general issues on environmental protection are considered to be outside this 
scope. In Germany and Italy NGOs do not have standing to defend general 
environmental interests in administrative court, unless they have been 
specifically granted this right through legislation.
169
 This has however been 
challenged by the recent case Trianel from the ECJ, where an NGO should 
be considered to have standing even though it could not demonstrate a 
breach of an individual right. This case is from 2009 and it is still unclear 
how this changes the legal framework for national law in Germany and 
Italy. It is clear from the case, that the national law must be set aside when 
EU law is at hand.
170
 
 
The intermediate approach has been adopted in most Member States and 
avoids actio popularis by demanding an ‘interest’ in the subject matter of 
the action. This interest is broader than the requirement of a subjective right, 
as demanded in the restrictive approach, but still ensures a connection 
between the plaintiff and the cause of action. This interest can be defined by 
the courts as quite wide, or rather narrow. In France and Belgium an NGO 
have to show that their interest is sufficiently individualized and distinct 
from a right that any citizen would have to be granted standing. The scope 
of the review is also broader than in the restrictive approach and any 
                                                 
168
 ENV.A.3/ETU/2002/0030, Final Report, ‘Access to Justice in Environmental Matters’, 
De Sadeleer, Roller and Dross, pp. 21 – 24, and 2012-11-11/Final, ‘Effective Justice?´, Jan 
Darpö, pp. 11 – 14.   
169
 ENV.A.3/ETU/2002/0030, Final Report, ‘Access to Justice in Environmental Matters’, 
De Sadeleer, Roller and Dross, pp. 21 – 24, and 2012-11-11/Final, ‘Effective Justice?´, Jan 
Darpö, pp. 11 – 14.   
170
 Case C-115/09 Trianel, judgment of 12 May, 2011. 
 47 
argument can be forwarded in court, including general compliances with 
environmental law.
171
 
 
All Member States have additional requirements on NGOs to be considered 
qualified entities that have standing, either through legislation or conditions 
introduced by the courts. For example, there should be a connection 
between the issue in question and the statute of the organization, a certain 
geographical reach, a form of legal personality, a minimum time period of 
existence, or a minimum number of members.
172
 In the case Djurgaarden 
the Swedish legislation, setting a minimum number of 2000 members for an 
NGO to be considered qualified, was too restrictive. The court however 
thought that a minimum number of members could be an efficient way to 
know that an organization is active. It is clear from the case that it is up to 
the Member States to legislate on what should be considered as a qualified 
entity, but the restrictions cannot go against the object to give wide access to 
justice.
173
 
 
Some Member States grant access for NGOs in civil courts (e.g. France, 
Italy, Portugal and Netherlands) and in other countries NGOs are not 
considered to have standing. Where NGOs are considered to be able to have 
standing there are two different approaches to this. The first one allows 
direct access for NGOs and the second approach only gives access to NGOs 
as an intervening part in an ongoing proceeding. In some Member States 
there is even a possibility for access to criminal court (e.g. France, Portugal 
and Italy). In France and Italy NGOs can only intervene in an ongoing 
prosecution on environmental damage. However, in Portugal NGOs can act 
as an assistant to the prosecution relating to environmental crimes.
 
In 
addition to this there are differences in the costs of the proceedings, the 
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scope of the review and the length of the proceedings, among other things. 
This together with the fact that there are different legal cultures and systems 
makes it difficult to compare the quality of access to justice in different 
Member States.
174
 It is thus clear that access to justice in Member States is 
not harmonized. One can find differences in giving a broad access to court 
or a more restrictive approach, the number of cases brought by NGOs, to 
what courts environmental complaints are brought and what socio-cultural 
conditions there are in the different Member States. I do think that there 
would be value in a more harmonized legislation on access to justice in the 
EU, which would not only make it easier for NGOs to access court, but also 
provide for a more leveled playing field. 
 
This is however easier said than done. It is hard to harmonize the European 
legal systems since the EU consists of Member States with different legal 
systems, and legal cultures. Another hurdle is the complexity of shared 
competence between the Union and its Member States. Member States have 
been reluctant towards a new directive on access to justice in environmental 
matter, and the main argument was the subsidiarity principle, meaning that 
the Member States are better suited to legislate in the area of access to 
justice. According to the principle of national procedural autonomy, Art 19 
(1) TEU, it is up to the Member State to determine the procedural conditions 
in the absence of Union rules. Another principle is the principle of sincere 
cooperation under Art 4 (3) TEU, that widens the principle of effectiveness 
and equivalence even more. There national courts are obliged to take 
procedural right under Union law, or from case law, under consideration 
when ruling on matters falling under EU law. This means that even if the 
EU is not considered to have the competence to legislate fully in the area of 
access to justice in environmental matters, they can still influence the 
procedural rules in national courts through preliminary rulings. This is also 
how the EU lately has tried to widen the scope of access to justice for NGOs 
in cases such as Trianel, Djurgaarden and Slovak Brown Bear. 
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2.6 Reflections on NGOs as a Voice for 
the Environment 
As Janez Potočnik says in his speech ‘The fish cannot go to Court’, the 
environment cannot protect itself; it is a public good and needs to be 
protected by a public voice.
175
 But are Environmental NGOs that voice? 
They do not represent ‘the public’, since a range of public interests often go 
against the interest of environmental protection, and environmental 
protection on a European scale sometimes goes against the objectives of a 
local environmental organization.
176
 However, the administration that today 
should protect our environment is perhaps not better at protecting it.  In 
times of economic needs the administration seeks solutions to its problems, 
even at the cost of the environment. That explains why economic interest 
wins over environmental interest in most cases.
177
  I hope, and think, that 
environmental NGOs have the capacity to put the interest of the 
environment at large over the interest of the local community, or one’s 
personal beliefs. NGOs could then serve as a guardian of our environment 
and ensure that national administrations give the environment the protection 
it needs. 
 
2.6.1 The impact of giving NGOs broad standing 
There is a general fear that broad standing for NGOs in environmental 
matters would make the judicial systems in EU overflow with 
environmental complaints. But in Member States that give wide access to 
justice for NGOs this have not been a problem. Even in the Member States 
that have the most cases they still only make out a small number of the cases 
brought to court.
178
 Advocate General Sharpston instead argues that giving 
NGOs a wide access to justice would gather individual complaints, and 
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would rather help not to clog the court systems with private litigations. In 
her Opinion in the case Djurgaarden, she also holds that NGOs have lots of 
expertise in environmental matters and would be able to share its expertise 
with the court.
179
 
 
It has also been seen that the actions brought by NGOs have a high success 
rate, which indicates that they do help to enforce environmental law in an 
important way, and that they are brought for legally sound reasons.
180
 
 
Another benefit of giving wide access to justice for NGOs is to enhance 
public participation, which is a way to express green values or an 
environmental movement that enhance the legitimacy of EU environmental 
legislation through national application of EU environmental law. It is also a 
way to create an awareness and debate amongst the public, and to educate 
the public towards making environmentally conscious decisions.
181
 
 
The European Commissioner for Environment Janez Potočnik has made 
implementation of Environmental law one of his key priorities. He thinks 
that better implementation is indispensable if we want to benefit from the 
current environmental legislation. Potočnik see a possibility for NGOs to fill 
the existing gap in enforcement of environmental law, through giving them 
wider access to court.
182
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3 Analysis 
Environmental NGOs have been given wider access to justice since the 
Aarhus Convention has been implemented in the EU both through directives 
and regulations, but most of all through progressive case law from the ECJ.  
But if this is this is enough to be considered to give the environment a voice, 
I am not sure.  
 
The legal framework that has been put into place does not implement all 
aspects of the Aarhus Convention. Access to justice in respect to public 
participation in decision-making only applies to EIAs and IPPC. Art 9 (3) 
has not been implemented, and it is up to each Member State to legislate on 
the matter, and at EU level there is still no actual possibility for judicial 
remedy for NGOs. Even though ECJ has taken steps in widening the scope 
of access to court, this does not mean that all Member States will follow this 
new approach. What is more likely to happen is that there will be different 
legal systems in the different Member States, and different interpretations 
and rulings on access to justice. This is not surprising since even the legal 
scholars argue about how to interpret for example the scope of Art 9 (3) 
from the case Slovak Brown Bear.  
 
It can be questioned whether the EU has succeeded to implement the Aarhus 
Convention to its own institutions and bodies, since there is a reluctance to 
give access to review environmental decisions at EU level. The Aarhus 
Regulation does give a right to internal review and judicial review, but it 
does not change the stringent rules on direct access to court under 263 
TFEU. In practice this means that NGOs still have no possibility to be 
considered to have standing. The old case law from Jégo Quéré and UPA 
still applies. A step in the right direction is the two recent cases concerning 
internal review from the General Court, saying that the strict interpretation 
of ‘administrative act’ is not in line with the Aarhus Convention. These 
cases have however been appealed by the Commission and we have to wait 
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for the judgment from the ECJ and see if the doctrine will change. In both 
the cases Jégo Quéré and UPA the ECJ overruled the progressive rulings 
from the General Court trying to change the doctrine on standing for 
individuals and NGOs under Art 263 TFEU.  
 
If the EU would be willing to widen the scope for access to court in its own 
sphere, there might also be less reluctance from the Member States to do the 
same. But the idea of implementing the Aarhus Convention from the EUs 
point of view seem to be to give wide access to court in Member States and 
that this will be enough, since there is a possibility to refer questions to the 
ECJ through a preliminary ruling. This approach has been reaffirmed in 
several rulings from the ECJ, such as UPA and Jégo Quéré. But I do not 
necessarily think that that is enough to comply with the Aarhus Convention 
and it is definitely not enough if the EU wants to give the environment a 
voice.  
 
In my opinion there is a need for EU to legislate on a new directive on 
access to justice, similar to the proposal COM (2003)624 Final. This would 
clarify the interpretation of the rulings form the ECJ and harmonize the 
legislation in Member States. This might however be easier said than done, 
since the Member States opposed a directive on access to justice, with 
regard to the subsidiarity principle, the last time the EU tried to legislate on 
the matter. Access to justice is a matter that for a long time was in the 
sphere in which only the Member States could legislate. Therefore this is a 
sensitive question of the autonomy of the Member States. A difference is 
that this time the ECJ have already made pretty clear that the Member States 
must grant access to justice if EU environmental law is breached. So the 
actual autonomy of the Member States has already been challenged, which 
was not the case when the proposal COM (2003)624 Final was turned 
down. There have also been some signs from the Commission, the Council 
and the Parliament that they see the need for a new directive on the matter. 
Whether the Member States are willing to agree on this is however not clear. 
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Another question is if NGOs really can be the voice the environment needs. 
NGOs have many times shown their dedication to protect the environment, 
and they have the knowledge and expertise to do so. However, there can be 
conflicting interests or the environmental NGO might be specialized in a 
specific field, and if there is another kind of problem they might not have 
the same incentive to act. Environmental NGOs should not be given the sole 
responsibility to be the guardian of the environment, but rather have the 
possibility to review the protection the administration gives to the 
environment. The authorities should still have the same responsibility to 
protect the environment, but there should be a wider access to review by 
external parties. This is what the Aarhus Convention aims at achieving, and 
the possibility to access information, participate in decision-making and 
access justice in environmental matters have increased since the EU became 
a party. It is a big step forward that NGOs have been accepted as ‘the public 
concerned’ and are given rights under the Aarhus Convention. However, I 
think the most progressive article with the best possibility to give the 
environment the voice it needs is Art 9 (3) that not only grant access to 
justice in respect to environmental information or public participation in 
decision-making, but when national (or EU) environmental law is breached 
by a private or a public person. This provision has not yet been implemented 
in EU through legislation and the interpretation differs in Member States.  
 
Today there is a lack of enforcement when it comes to EU environmental 
law, and the cost of environmental damage is often externalized. If there 
would be wider access to justice for NGOs in Art 9 (3) situations, it would 
not only help to enforce EU and national environmental law, but also 
internalize the costs of environmental damage, as NGOs would then have 
the possibility to bring polluters to court. For this to become a reality and 
not only a theoretical possibility there is a need for a clear legal base that 
would force Member States to implement that legislation. The case Slovak 
Brown Bear is important, but the actual change in access to justice for 
NGOs in these cases will not come that easy. Some Member States will 
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interpret the case law strictly and other less so, but if we want to give the 
environment the protection it needs, the rules need to be clear.  
 
If the environmental NGOs are not given access to court as intended by the 
Aarhus Convention they cannot be the voice the environment so desperately 
needs. The EU has come a long way towards giving NGOs access to justice, 
but there is still some way to go before they have the means they need to be 
the guardian of the environment. I think that the environment needs many 
voices and that environmental NGOs can be an important one of these, if 
given the chance. 
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